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Information Based Regulation and International Trade
in Genetically Modified Agricultural Products: An
Evaluation of The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
Michael P. Healy'
INTRODUCTION
This Article considers the regulation of international trade in
genetically modified agricultural products. Specifically, it addresses
both products released into the environment as seeds and products
intended for consumption as food. The first part of the Article
describes the significance of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
in modem agriculture, especially agriculture in the United States
This discussion summarizes the risks and potential benefits
associated with the use of agricultural GMOs, especially the risks and
benefits related to biodiversity. The Article then briefly describes the
approaches to the regulation of these products adopted in the
Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(Protocol).2 The Protocol basically pursues two different regulatory
* Dorothy Salmon Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D.
1984, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 1978, Williams College. This Article was prepared for
the 2002 National Association of Environmental Law Societies' (NAELS) Conference:
"Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future" held at Washington University School of Law in
St. Louis on March 15-17, 2002. The author thanks his colleagues, Kathryn Moore and John
Rogers, for discussing several of the issues addressed in the Article, and thanks to Mr. George
Van Cleve for discussing the risks to human health posed by genetically modified food
products. The author is responsible for any errors.
1. See infra Part .
2. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 4, Jan.
29, 2000, 39 LL.M. 1027 (2000), available at http'//www.biodiv.org/conventinr/articles.
asplg=O&a=cbd-04.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Protocol]. Part II infra
discusses the Protocol's requirements. Eleven nations have ratified the Protocol. See
http'//www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.asporder=date (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). Article
37 provides that "[tihis Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of
deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States or
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approaches. The Protocol adopts a regime of Advanced Informed
Agreement (AIA) for the transboundary import of genetically
modified food products released into the environment. Genetically
modified agricultural products intended for consumption as food are
subject to a more ambiguous regulatory scheme, which includes a
labeling requirement for product shipments.
The next two parts of the Article consider these different
regulatory approaches in greater detail. The Article criticizes the
details of each of the Protocol's two regulatory regimes. One fault is
that the Protocol does not help allocate the burden of proof with
respect to the importing nation's decision to accept genetically
modified products' introduction into the environment.3 The Protocol
is incoherent in two respects regarding the regime for the import of
genetically modified food products. First, when an importing nation
accepts genetically modified products that pose risks to biological
diversity, including human health, the Protocol should require a label
that identifies the product as genetically modified.4 Second, the
Protocol is flawed because it requires labels for shipments of
genetically modified food products even if they pose no identifiable
risk to consumers. 5 Generally, however, the Protocol's regime should
be lauded because it may provide consumers with the information
they need to make informed decisions about the foods they consume.
I. BIOTECHNOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, AND THE CARTAGENA
PROTOCOL
Article 2 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity broadly
deffins "biotechnology" as "any technological application that uses
biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make
or modify products or processes for specific use." 6 Biotechnology is
regional economic integration organizations that are Parties to the Convention." 39 I.L.M. 1027,
1042 (2000).
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. 31 I.L.M. 818, 823 (1992) (entered into force on Dec. 29, 1993). The United States
signed the treaty on June 4, 1993, but has not ratified the treaty. See Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity/Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, available at http://www.biodiv.org/
world/parties.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2002).
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an increasingly important issue in international relations,7 and it plays
an especially important role in modem agriculture.8 Two specific
examples of biotechnology's impact on agriculture are "roundup
ready" soybeans and "Bt" com. The genetic material of these plants
is engineered in the first case to survive the application of a
herbicide, 9 and in the second to kill insects eating the plant.10 There
are numerous other examples of such crops.
The significance of biotechnology for modem agriculture can be
assessed from several perspectives. Although specific estimates vary,
an inescapable conclusion is that modem agricultural production
yields very substantial and growing amounts of GMOs. 12 Production
7. See Stephen McCaffrey, Biotechnology: Some Issues of General International Law,
14 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 91, 92 (2001). "Tihe rules of international law must be applied to many
different forms of genetically-engineered products: from pharmaceuticals made from samples
taken in developing countries, to GM food, crops, and seeds." Id.
8. See Gareth W. Schweizer, Note, The Negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 577, 594 (2000). "Food commodities make up the largest group of
[GMOs] .... Id. (footnote omitted).
9. Id. at 581. "Roundup-Ready crops are genetically engineered to resist glyphosate, a
common herbicide, so that only the crop will survive after spraying." Id. (footnote omitted).
10. Id. "'[Bit,' or Bacillis Thuringiensis, is a bacteria that is toxic to insects. In [Bt corn],
the Bt toxin is incorporated into the DNA of every cell of a plant so that insects die if they eat
the plant" Id. (footnotes omitted).
11. McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 93. "Since 1992, dozens of [these crops] have been
approved for sale to American farmers and hundreds more are in the pipeline, with genes
borrowed from every form of life: bacterial, viral, insect, even animal." Id. (internal quotations
and footnote omitted); see also Marc Victor, Precaution or Protectionism? The Precautionary
Principle, Genetically Modified Organisms, and Allowing Unfounded Fear to Undermine Free
Trade, 14 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 295, 296 (2001). "The U.S. Department of Agriculture has
approved fifty plant varieties, termed Genetically-modified Organisms (GMO), for use within
the United States. In contrast, the EU has only approved eighteen GMOs." Id. (footnote
omitted).
12. See McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 94. "Farmers have embraced [genetically-modified]
products to the extent that biotech seeds are used in plants that produced twenty to forty-five
percent of the com, soybean, and cotton produced in the United States in 1999 (although the
experience with StarLink cor has had a chilling effect on the use of GM seeds)." Id. (footnotes
omitted); see also Victor, supra note 11, at 296 (stating "[n]early half of the soybeans and a
third of the corn grown in the United States is [sic] genetically altered") (footnote omitted);
Mary Lynne Kupchella, Note, Agricultural Biotechnology: Why it Can Save the Environment
and Developing Nations, but May Never Get a Chance, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 721, 724 (2001) (stating "[i]n 1998, genetically engineered crops accounted for 25% of
cor acreage planted in the United States, 38% of soy bean acreage, and 45% of cotton acreage,
for a total of 45 million acres, an increase of 250% from 1997. In 1999, biotechnology plantings
in the U.S. increased to 62 million acres .... .") (footnotes and internal quotations omitted).
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of roundup ready soybeans 13 and Bt COrn14 contribute to the striking
growth in production. This growth in production is matched by a
growth in the level of consumption of genetically engineered food
products. 5
Not surprisingly, the economic stakes associated with
opportunities for unrestricted trade in genetically modified
agricultural products are already high and are steadily increasing.'
6
Countries that have an economic interest in trading these products,
most especially the United States,' 7 have promoted their interests in
unimpeded trade.' 8 Moreover, this interest in the rules of trade for
13. See Schweizer, supra note 8, at 581 n.22. "Roundup-Ready soybeans were planted on
over half of the United States's soy acres last year." Id. (citation omitted).
14. Id. at 582 n.29. "Bt corn was approved for sale in 1996. In 1997, about 5 percent of
the nation's corn crop was Bt com. By 1999, more than one-third of U.S. corn acres were Bt
corn." Id. (citations omitted).
15. See McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 94. "Most Americans have probably eaten some food
made with genetically-modified soy or corn." Id. (internal quotations and footnote omitted); see
also Henrique Freire de Oliveira Souza, Genetically Modified Plants: A Need for International
Regulation, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & CoMP. L. 129, 131 (2000). Also note that "60% to 70% of
foods sold in the U.S.A contain substances developed through genetic engineering." Id.
(footnote omitted). "Nowadays about 2.5 billion people have been eating GMP directly or
indirectly, knowingly or not." Id. at 140-41. "[A]ccording to Mothers for Natural Law] 60 to 70
percent of foods on U.S. grocery store shelves contain genetically engineered substances." Id. at
141 (footnote and internal quotation omitted).
16. See Victor, supra note 11, at 309. "In 1998, the United States lost $200 million in corn
sales alone because of delays in the EU's approval process for GMOs." Id. (footnote omitted).
See also de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 140-41 (stating "[e]ach day more countries are
allowing cultivation of GMP, in a market that will reach US$ 500 billions/year in the next few
years") (footnote omitted); McCaffrey supra note 7, at 94 (stating "[s]eed and chemical
companies stand to make huge profits from these new products").
17. Kupchella, supra note 12, at 732. "Of the thirty-five million hectares planted in 1998
of genetically-modified crops, eighty-eight percent were planted in North America, and less
than one percent was planted in Europe." Id. (footnote omitted); see also de Oliveira Souza,
supra note 15, at 141. "[A]ccording to Charles Margulis, a genetic engineering campaigner for
Greenpeace, it is estimated that 75 percent of all bio-engineered crops are grown in the U.S
." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
18. In the negotiation of the Protocol
[t]he Miami Group represented nations most opposed to efforts to control [GMOs] and
claimed to harbor an overall concern for harmonizing environmental protection with
sustainable growth of agricultural economies. These industrialized countries stood to
suffer the most economic loss by regulations imposed on [GMOs], and they feared that
elaborate paperwork needed to enforce such controls on commodities... would create
insuperable obstacles for international trade, given the huge number of transboundary
movements each year.
Schweizer, supra note 8, at 587 (footnotes and internal quotations omitted).
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genetically engineered agricultural products has implications for
trade in all agricultural products.' 9
Commentators who laud the "immense" benefits of biotechnology
welcome figures that demonstrate the growing significance of
biotechnology in modem agriculture." Those promoting the
agricultural applications of biotechnology cite several benefits. First,
genetically modified crops may reduce the need for, and application
of, such agricultural toxins as herbicides2 or insecticides.22 Second,
genetically modified crops may provide higher yields of crops and
thereby reduce demand for land dedicated to agricultural use.
23
19. Schweizer, supra note 8, at 592 (footnotes omitted):
For example, in the United States, the largest producer of bioengineered crops, mixes
grains that have been genetically modified with unadulterated grains distributed in
commerce. An AIA applicable to all GMOs could severely harm the American grain
trade because it would impact almost all grain exported from the United States.
20. Kupchella, supra note 12, at 722. "While there are potential risks to agricultural
biotechnology, and the long-term effects are unknown, the benefits of this technology are
immense." Id. (footnote omitted). "Agricultural biotechnology has the potential to solve many
of the most daunting environmental problems facing the world, such as a decrease in
biodiversity and shortages of food. With proper regulation, biotechnology can save biodiversity
and solve numerous other environmental concerns." Id. at 721 (footnotes omitted); see also
Richard M. Saines, Rotterdam Treaty on PIC and Biosafety Protocol: Examples of Increased
Transparency, Technology Sharing, and Accountability in International Law, 24 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 623, 626 (2001). "Proponents of biotechnology see the genetic modification of
organisms as a powerful tool in the global battle against hunger and poverty, as well as a means
to improve the environment by reducing the need for pesticides and other chemicals to produce
food." Id.
21. Kupchella, supra note 12, at 724-25. "The use of herbicide-resistant crops will likely
cause a reduction in the quantities of herbicides used.... Proponents of resistant crops also
believe that they will allow older, more toxic and generally more harmful herbicides to be
replaced with ones which are more environmentally favorable." Id. (footnotes omitted).
22. Schweizer, supra note 8, at 581. "[Bt] crops will require fewer insecticide
applications." Id. (footnote omitted).
23. Id. "Cultivating Bt crops in place of non-GMOs can stimulate higher yields from the
same plot of land... In 1998,4 billion more pounds of field corn were produced because of Bt
technology than would have been available without such technology." Id. (footnote and internal
quotations omitted); see also Kupchella, supra note 12, at 727-28.
Higher-yielding crops are yet another way in which biotechnology will aid agricultural
output.... If higher-yielding crops are not used, wild lands will have to be used for
agriculture. On the other hand, if the same product can be produced with less
cultivated land, then more land can be returned to a natural habitat. Genetically-
modified crops will also result in land that needs less tilling, benefiting the
environment through decreased erosion and soil infertility.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Lastly, genetically modified crops may provide food products with an
enhanced nutritional value and thereby alleviate the scale of human
malnutrition.24
The important role that biotechnology plays in modem agriculture
has grown rapidly despite the risks that genetic modification poses
for the environment and human health. The greatest concern about
the genetic modification of plants is the threat to biological
diversity.
25
The use of genetically modified agricultural products is
understood to pose two general threats to biodiversity. First is "[t]he
risk that altered DNA will contaminate an ecosystem," referred to as
"genetic pollution. 2 6 Such pollution was recently identified in
Mexico, where "DNA from genetically modified corn has found its
way into native corn varieties growing in remote southern Mexico,
heightening fears about the dangers of bioengineered crops.
27
Apparently, the polluting DNA came from consumable modified corn
24. See Kupchella, supra note 12, at 726. "Biotechnology will also be able to solve
nutritional deficiencies in developing nations. Approximately 400 million women suffer from
iron deficiency in third-world nations where the staple diet is rice. A new variety of rice
containing iron and vitamin A will be able to decrease this number." Id. (footnotes omitted); see
also de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 138.
The main benefits of biotechnology can be summarized in the following way: (a) it
contributes to the human food supply and to the protection of biodiversity, allowing a
more efficient use of land, and a more productive harvest; (b) it improves the quality
of food; (c) it may contribute to reducing the use of agrochemicals and pesticide; and
finally (d) it may be helpful for the maintenance of germplasm collections.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
25. Jim Chen, Diversity and Deadlock- Transcending Conventional Wisdom on the
Relationship Between Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,625,
10,627 (2001) (footnotes omitted). Professor Chen has argued forcefully that
[b]iodiversity preservation is arguably humanity's greatest challenge. It certainly
qualifies if the relevant gauge is the duration and difficulty of corrective measures.
According to the geological record of previous extinction spasms, the "full recovery of
biodiversity" after a catastrophe such as a meteor strike "require[s] between 10 and
100 million years." By this measure, "the loss of genetic and species diversity by the
destruction of natural habitats" is probably the contemporary crisis "our descendants
[will] most regret" and "are least likely to forgive."
Id.
26. See Schweizer, supra note 8, at 583 (footnote omitted).
27. Alex Dominguez, Scientists Find Genetically-Modified Corn DNA has Spread to
Mexican Maize, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 29, 2001, at 1 (copy on file with author).
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used as seed.28 The effects of genetic pollution are difficult to predict
and are likely to vary,29 but could potentially include super insects
30
and super weeds.3'
Related to the phenomenon of genetic pollution is the threat that
"the use of GMOs may also cause the loss of diversity in a gene pool,
a process also known as 'genetic erosion."' 32 Such erosion may occur
as the ecosystem changes in response to its newly modified
organisms.33 Moreover, biotechnology may have more direct, though
unintended, consequences for species in the affected ecosystem.34
28. Id. "Researchers suspect imported genetically-modified corn was handed out by a
government agency as food and may have been planted by recipients near their traditional
crops." Id.
29. See Kupchella, supra note 12, at 728, 729 (footnotes omitted):
Yet unknown is what types of interactions genetically-modified plants will have with
other species. There is a fear that genetically altered organisms will become
agricultural pests or colonize natural ecosystems, disturbing balances, especially where
characteristics would allow it to compete successfully. It is possible that these new
organisms will hybridize with a related wild species thereby producing hybrid progeny
that are harder to control. Even plants which are unlikely to escape into the wild can
potentially change populations of microorganisms in the soil and the types and
numbers of insects and other animals in surrounding areas.
30. Schweizer, supra note 8, at 582. "Regular exposure to Bts can result in insects
developing a resistance to the toxin, thus becoming 'super-insects."' Id.; see also de Oliveira
Souza, supra note 15, at 139. "[While crops may be engineered to contain natural insecticides,
insects can adapt, becoming resistant much more quickly than expected." Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
31. See Schwiezer, supra note 8, at 581. "The main risk surrounding Roundup-Ready
crops is that if bees or wind transfer the pollen from these crops to wild plants, weeds can also
develop resistance to herbicides." Id. (footnote omitted). de Oliveira Souza elaborates further
about these risks.
[T]he first risks are indicated by FAO in the following way 'The inclusion of novel
genes for herbicide resistance in plants may increase the occurrence of weeds with
resistance to certain agrochemicals, the [FAO] reported warned. The inclusion of pest
resistance in plants should be carefully evaluated for potential development of
resistance in pests and possible side-effects on beneficial organisms.
de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 138-39 (footnotes omitted).
32. Schweizer, supra note 8, at 583.
33. de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 139 (internal quotations and footnote omitted):
The introduction of any new organism into an ecosystem might affect the dynamics of
the ecosystem or the gene pool of wild relatives. These effects can happen whether the
new organism is a new crop variety or a new microorganism introduced for disease
control, and whether it is genetically-engineered, bred by traditional means, or simply
from a different ecosystem.
34. Schweizer, supra note 8, at 582. "[Bt crops] can kill beneficial insects, such as bees
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Choices by farmers may increasingly limit the range of plants grown
for agricultural purposes.35 This latter effect may yield adverse
economic, as well as environmental, effects.36 Genetic pollution and
genetic erosion are present in certain geographic areas located in less-
developed nations that have richly diverse ecosystems which are
untested in terms of the impacts on biodiversity.
37
When compared to the risks that agricultural biotechnology poses
to the environment, the risks posed to human health so far appear
more limited. Genetic engineering poses risks related to human
allergies.38 Significant uncertainty prevails in this area, because
and ladybugs, when they eat the engineered crop." Id. (footnotes omitted).
35. de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 139. "[A]nother risk is the loss of diversity
provoked by the widespread use of one-or a few-species of crops." Id. (footnote omitted).
Cf. John Ntambirweki, Biotechnology and International Law Within the North-South Context,
14 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 103, 104 (2001). Uganda has traditionally grown more than thirty
species of bananas, but today "[tlhe plant breeders have now come in with their few varieties.
Everybody is rushing for the new bigger banana bunches which fetch more in the market. The
diversity that was conserved by farmers for millennia is being steadily lost." Id.
36. de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 138 (citation, footnote, and internal quotations
omitted):
[S]mall farmers fear that a small number of large corporations will be able to comer
the market on genetically engineered animals, thereby depriving the small family
farms of their livelihood. Additionally, the farmers are concerned that the initial
acquisition price of genetically altered animals, and the subsequent royalties, will
increase rather than decrease the costs for farmers and consumers.
37. See Schweizer, supra note 8, at 584 (footnotes omitted):
Although industrialized countries have tested the environmental impact of GMOs on
their own land, testing in these countries may not necessarily prove that GMOs are
safe in a different ecological setting. As a result of these unknown risks, environmental
activists have petitioned for a global ban on GMOs until the long-term safety of their
use is better understood.
Cf. id. at 583 (footnote omitted):
Exposing crops to the wild genes preserved in centers of origin, natural areas where
wild relatives of cultivated crops grow, helps to restore vigor to a crop. If GMOs were
mistakenly released in a center of origin, the genetic make-up of the gene pool could
become permanently altered.
38. See Committee on Genetically Modified Pest-Protected Plants, National Research
Council, Genetically Modified Pest-Protected Plants: Science and Regulation (2000)
[hereinafter NRC Report], which reported that:
The potential risks of transgenic pest-protected plants to human health are generally
related to the possibility of introducing new allergens or toxins into food-plant
varieties, the possibility of introducing new allergens into pollen, or the possibility that
previously unknown protein combinations now being produced in food plants will
[Vol. 9:205
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allergenicity risks are extremely difficult to assess39 and testing for
human health effects has been sporadic and inconsistent.40 Moreover,
incidents of serious risks to human health arising from adaptations to
the genetic material of traditional food products41 give rise to
concerns that engineered changes in plant genes may cause other,
similar risks to human health.42 Interestingly, the Protocol itself
defines the scope of the agreement by reference to "adverse effects on
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking
also into account risks to human health. ' 43 The Protocol thereby
makes protection of human health subsidiary to the protection of
biological diversity.
II. THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS
This Article will now describe the regulatory approach to
genetically modified agricultural products defined by the Protocol.
44
Congress adopted the Protocol "[o]n 29 January 2000, after some five
years of difficult negotiations. 45 In the view of one observer,
negotiations reflected the policy concerns of environmental, rather
than agricultural, ministries46 and made evident that "the underlying
have unforeseen secondary or pleiotropic effects....
Id. at 62-63; de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 139. "The main risk to health is allergy, and
one example is found in the allergic side effects provoked by the addition of Brazil nut protein
in a soybean." Id. (footnote omitted); see also Kupchella, supra note 12, at 730. "One of the
strongest arguments for the regulation of transgenic food concerns the spread of allergenicity
throughout the food supply." Id.
39. See NRC Report, supra note 38, at 66 ("Allergenicity is difficult to test, in part
because prior exposure is a prerequisite to an allergic reaction."); see also id. at 68-69
(discussing difficulty of testing because of dietary limits and limited time).
40. See id. at 63 (describing limited "detailed assessments of safety for humans or
domestic animals").
41. See id. at 70-71 (describing human health risks resulting from conventionally-bred
varieties of potatoes and celery).
42. See id. at 66 (referring to the human health risk posed by genetic engineering of
soybeans). See generally George Van Cleve, Regulating Environmental and Safety Hazards of
Agricultural Biotechnology ForA Sustainable World, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 245 (2002).
43. Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 4.
44. 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000).
45. Peter-Tobias Stoll, Controlling the Risks of Genetically-Modified Organisms: The
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the SPS Agreement, 10 Y.B. OF INT'L ENVTL. L. 82, 82
(1999); see id. at 86-87 (summarizing interests represented in the negotiations).
46. See Thomas Jacob, The Cartagena Protocol: A First Step to a Global Biosafety
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notion that most of the countries brought to the table was that
genetically modified organisms [] are inherently dangerous.
'4 7
In considering the structure of the regulatory scheme adopted in
the Protocol, the parties notably refrained from using the more
common term, GMO, and instead substituted the apparently more
restrictive term, "living-modified organism" (LMO). An LMO is
defined as "any living organism that possesses a novel combination
of genetic material obtained through the use of modem
biotechnology.4 8  The regulatory scheme then establishes
Structure?, 14 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 79, 81 (2001):
By and large, most of the countries came to the table with their environment
ministries, leaving their agricultural ministries at home. Lacking was the kind of
interdisciplinary and/or interagency process that the United States and a number of
other countries use in negotiation of these types of international agreements ensuring
that all the interests of a particular country and society are integrated. The fact that
most countries did not involve their agricultural ministries is also important because
much of the Protocol is focused on agricultural applications. The individuals in those
ministries have the expertise regarding application of the existing international
agriculture and food safety instruments. On the other hand, among the environment
ministry participants, in some cases there was very little involvement and awareness of
those existing instruments.
Mr. Jacob works for DuPont, which has a significant interest in the profitability of
biotechnology. Id. at 80. The regulatory concerns of the negotiators of the Protocol contrast
with the regulatory concerns of the agency primarily responsible for regulation of genetically-
modified agricultural products within the United States.
The [New York] Times report notes that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
is "the primary agency responsible for assuring the ecological safety of [genetically
modified] plants," and points out that the USDA "has not rejected a single application
for a genetically engineered crop." Some scientists criticize these approvals on the
ground that the Agency often relies on claims and studies conducted by the seed
companies themselves.
According to the report, USDA has set no scientific standards for evaluating the
environmental safety of a genetically engineered plant. The Times further states that
rather than demanding specific experiments and data to establish safety, as is the case
in other fields, the USDA "asks only that petitioners explain why the new plant is
unlikely or likely to pose a number of broadly defined risks." But USDA officials
defend their decisions, even while they "acknowledge that their system for weighing
applications is evolving."
McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 93 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
47. Jacob, supra note 46, at 81.
48. See Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 3(g). One commentator described the negotiation of
this particular term.
One of the important roles of the Protocol was to set forth various generally acceptable
definitions for many important terms, allowing for consistency in use. Since the
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requirements for the transboundary shipment of LMOs for use in
agricultural products and other requirements for shipments of LMOs
intended for use in animal feed or for human consumption.49 A
summary of these differing regulatory approaches follows.
Articles 8, 9, 10, and 12 of the Protocol define the AIA procedure
that applies "prior to the first intentional transboundary movement of
living modified organisms for intentional introduction into the
environment of the Party of import."50 The Protocol's AIA procedure
"does not make any groundbreaking innovations. It simply expands
upon the elements contained in Article 19 of the Convention on
Biological Diversity [(CBD)]. It gives flesh to the concept of
'advance informed agreement' provided for in the CBD."5' The
Protocol provides that the exporting party must notify the importing
party of the intended transboundary introduction of an LMO into the
importing country.52 The importing party must acknowledge the
notice,53 then decide whether to consent to the import.54 The
importing party has an obligation to provide reasons to the exporting
party any time that unconditional consent is not given.55 The standard
the importing party must apply when deciding whether to consent to
Protocol was intended to be a legally binding international instrument, a lot of time
went into these definitions-almost a year was spent trying to define with precision
exactly what is covered under the term "living modified organism." It was decided that
the generic term "genetically-modified organism" would not be used since the
negotiators felt a more scientifically precise definition was needed.
Jacob, supra note 46, at 83.
49. See Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 7. The terms of the Protocol also define three
important limits on its scope. First, "Protocol shall not apply to the transboundary movement of
living modified organisms which are pharmaceuticals for humans that are addressed by other
relevant international agreements or organizations [sic]." Id. at Art. 5. Second, "the provisions
of this Protocol with respect to the advance informed agreement procedure shall not apply to
living modified organisms in transit." Id. at Art. 6(1). Third, "the provisions of this Protocol
with respect to the advance informed agreement procedure shall not apply to the transboundary
movement of living modified organisms destined for contained use undertaken in accordance
with the standards of the Party of import." Id. at Art. 6(2).
50. Id. at Art. 7(1).
51. Ntambirweki, supra note 35, at 125; see also McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 96. "The
AIA procedure under the Protocol is generally congruent with PIC under other agreements, but
contains more specific and detailed time periods for decision-making." Id. (footnote omitted).
52. See Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 8(l).
53. See id. at Art. 9.
54. Seeid. atArt. 10.
55. See id. at Art. 10(4).
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import is ambiguous under the Protocol. The Protocol provides that a
party may decline to consent to import, notwithstanding a "lack of
scientific certainty.,
56
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant
scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of
the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in
the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human
health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as
appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified
organism in question .. in order to avoid or minimize such
potential adverse effects.
57
The Protocol also includes, however, two provisions that may
limit the ability of the importing party to refuse consent to
importation of the LMO. First, Article 15 provides that the risk
assessment, used as the basis for the consent decision, "shall be
carried out in a scientifically sound manner, in accordance with
Annex HI and taking into account recognized risk assessment
techniques." 58 This requirement of a scientifically sound risk
assessment may place the burden on the importing country to present
evidence of risk in order to refuse consent.5 9 Second, the preamble to
the Protocol "[e]mphasiz[es] that this Protocol shall not be
interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a
Party under any existing international agreements., 60 This language
appears to subject the Protocol to the constraints imposed on the
regulation of international trade by the World Trade Organization
(WTO), including the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Standards.61 The apparent clarity of this preamble language is,
however, muddied by the next clause of the Protocol's preamble,
56. See id. at Art. 10(6).
57. Id.
58. See id. at Art. 15(1).
59. See Schweizer, supra note 8, at 599. "By including an AIA, the Protocol gives
countries the power to refuse to import a genetically modified crop.... [Clountries must base
any rejection of GMOs on scientific findings, and not on unfounded fears." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
60. Protocol, supra note 2, at Preamble (emphasis added).
61. See infra Part III.
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which states the "fuinderstanding that the above recital is not
intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international
agreements." 62 The juxtaposition of the two clauses in the preamble is
as striking as it is confusing.
63
Article 8 of the Protocol defines the procedures that apply to the
transboundary movement of a LMO "for direct use as food or feed, or
for processing. ' " These products are not subject to the AIA
65requirement. Instead, the Protocol provides vaguely that "[a] Party
may take a decision on the import of living modified organisms
intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, under its
domestic regulatory framework that is consistent with the objective
of this Protocol. ' 66 Article 11 requires parties to provide information
about their decisions on the import of LMOs to the Biosafety
Clearinghouse, established under Article 20 of the Protocol. 67 Indeed,
this reporting requirement broadly applies to the reporting of any
"final decision regarding domestic use, including placing on the
market, of a LMO that may be subject to transboundary movement
for direct use as food or feed, or for processing."
68
62. Protocol, supra note 2, at Preamble (emphasis added).
63. One commentator has written that the language of the preamble "is supremely
ambiguous." Jacob, supra note 46, at 86.
64. Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 8.
65. For a description of the Protocol's approach to controlling the movement of LMOs,
see McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 95.
Not only is the Protocol limited in scope to LMOs, its basic approach to controlling the
transboundary movement of those organisms-the "advanced informed agreement"
(AIA) procedure ... -does not apply to agricultural commodities. Thus, genetically
engineered food, perhaps the chief concem of the public, is not subject to an AIA
requirement"
Id.; see also Jacob, supra note 46, at 84. "Excepted from the application of the advanced
informed agreement (AIA) process were 'living modified organisms intended for direct uses as
food feed or for processing'--in essence, the commodity movement of grains and such." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
66. Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 11(4). The Protocol also provides special rules
regarding this decision-making for "[a] developing country Party or a Party with an economy in
transition." Id. at 11(6). If such a nation lacks the requisite domestic regulatory framework, it is
authorized to "declare through the Biosafety Clearing-House that its decision prior to the first
import of a living modified organism intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing,
on which information has been provided . . ., will be taken" based on a risk assessment
conforming to the Protocol's requirements and completed within 270 days. See id.
67. Seeid. atArt. 11(1).
68. Id.
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The Protocol also includes a requirement unrelated to the
importing nation's approval of the modified food products.
Genetically modified food products must bear labels "clearly
identifying that they 'may contain' living modified organisms and are
not intended for intentional introduction into the environment, as well
as a contact point for further information." 69 This labeling
requirement,70 watered down by its very terms, was opposed by the
major industrialized exporters of agricultural products.
While [major industrialized exporters] succeeded in preventing
the Protocol from imposing strict regulations on commodities
exports, the adopted Protocol does contain a provision
requiring exporters to label any shipments that may include
genetically altered substances with the phrase "May contain
living modified organisms." As a result, importers have the
option to label any products as such, and consumers will be
able to decide whether or not they want to purchase products
that may be genetically altered.7'
These requirements fully define the Protocol's regulatory scheme
for the transmission and disclosure of information among the
importing and exporting parties, as well as purchasers. Parties to the
Protocol will address additional rules of liability and redress, with a
goal of four years set by the Protocol.
72
It is important to now turn to an assessment of the Protocol's
regulatory regime, first with respect to the AIA procedure and then
with respect to the labeling requirement.
69. Id. at Art. 18(2).
70. See Saines, supra note 20, at 627. "Article 18 of the [P]rotocol requires LMOs to be
clearly labeled, including separate labeling requirements for LMOs intended for direct use as
food or feed or for processing." Id. For a discussion of the significance of this labeling
requirement, see infra Part IV.
71. Schweizer, supra note 8, at 600 (footnotes omitted). The Protocol provides that
"detailed requirements for th[e] purpose" of labeling LMO food products are to be defined
within two years. Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 18(2)(a). The work began at a June 2001
meeting of technical experts. See Saines, supra note 20, at 627.
72. See Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 27; see also McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 95. The
Protocol "postpones entirely the question of liability for harm resulting from the transboundary
movement of LMOs." Id. (footnote omitted).
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Ill. RISK ASSESSMENT AND A PARTY'S AIA
A basic understanding of the treatment of risk assessments in state
decisions to limit international trade is important to an evaluation of
the AIA procedure established by the Protocol and an understanding
of whether the Protocol seeks to reshape international trade law.
International agreements define the current risk assessment and trade
regulation regime and provide for the WTO.73 One such agreement is
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement).74 The SPS Agreement's definition of a
"[s]anitary or phytosanitary measure" would clearly include an
importing nation's decision to exclude LMO's based on the risk
posed to biodiversity or to require product labeling. 75 If the measure
conforms to the requirements of the SPS Agreement, then the
73. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (Apr.
15, 1994) [hereinafter GATT]. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
74. The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-etsps-e/spsagre.htm (last visited
Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
75. The SPS Agreement provides that such a measure is
[a]ny measure applied:
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-
carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms;
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in
foods, beverages or feedstuffs;
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks
arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry,
establishment or spread of pests; or
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the
entry, establishment or spread of pests. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all
relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter alia,
end product criteria; processes and production methods; testing, inspection,
certification and approval procedures; quarantine treatments including relevant
requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials
necessary for their survival during transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods,
sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and packaging and labelling
requirements directly related to food safety.
SPS Agreement, supra note 74, at Annex A: Definitions (1).
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measure presumptively conforms to the 1994 General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
76
The SPS Agreement requires first that members base any sanitary
or phytosanitary measure on a risk assessment." The SPS Agreement
requires, moreover, that "each Member shall avoid arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels [of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection] it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if
such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade.,
7 8
The WTO dispute resolution framework has resolved disputes
over the requirements established by the SPS Agreement. The WTO
Appellate Body has, in particular, given content to the requirement
that nations impose protective measures only on the basis of a
sufficient risk assessment.
A risk assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 must
(1) identify the diseases whose entry, establishment or
spread a Member wants to prevent within its territory, as well
as the potential biological and economic consequences
associated with the entry, establishment or spread of these
diseases;
76. Id. at Art. 2(4). "Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant
provisions of this Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the obligations of the
Members under the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or
phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b)." Id.
77. See id. at Art. 5(1). "[M]embers shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary
measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to
human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed
by the relevant international organizations." Id. The SPS Agreement defines a "[r]isk
assessment" as
[the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease
within the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary
measures which might be applied, and of the associated potential biological and
economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on
human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or
disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.
Id. at Annex A: Definitions (4).
78. Id. at Art. 5(5).
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(2) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread
of these diseases, as well as the associated potential biological
and economic consequences; and
(3) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread
of these diseases according to the SPS measures which might
be applied.79
These components of the risk assessment mean that
[i]t is not sufficient that a risk assessment conclude that there is
a possibility of entry, establishment or spread of diseases and
associated biological and economic consequences. A proper
risk assessment of this type must evaluate the "likelihood", i.e.,
the "probability", of entry, establishment or spread of diseases
and associated biological and economic consequences as well
as the "likelihood", i.e., "probability", of entry, establishment
or spread of diseases according to the SPS measures which
might be applied. 0
Evaluation of the "likelihood" need not be quantitative, and the
SPS Agreement does not mandate a threshold level of risk. "The
likelihood may be expressed either quantitatively or qualitatively.
Furthermore, ...there is no requirement for a risk assessment to
establish a certain magnitude or threshold level of degree of risk."'8
79. Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WTO Appellate Body,
WT/DS18/AB/R, 121 (Oct. 20, 1998) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Australia-Measures].
80. Id. 123; see de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 169-70 (footnotes omitted):
When adopting measures related to technical barriers to trade (e.g., basic standards and
labels) the evaluation of the risks justifying the measure must be done based on
"available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or
intended end-uses ofproducts." Scientific evidence as such has played an essential role
in the adoption of restrictive measures.
The range of acceptable scientific evidence in defining risk is broad. See Victor, supra note 11,
at 312 (footnotes omitted):
A member country need not rely on 'mainstream' scientific opinion to establish
sufficient scientific evidence as required by the SPS Agreement, but can rely upon
what may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources. A
panel is given a great deal of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient
scientific evidence.
81. See Australia-Measures, supra note 79, at 124 (footnotes omitted). The Appellate
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Finally, the SPS agreement requires an independent evaluation of risk
with regard to the effects of the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
measures.
82
SPS measures that have the effect of limiting international trade
must meet a threshold determination that a risk actually exists and
that the measures will actually reduce that risk. This requirement
should preclude a nation from employing SPS measures for the
purpose of limiting imports.8 3 Moreover, the SPS Agreement requires
that SPS measures be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.84 The
Body provided additional elaboration when it stated that "the 'risk' evaluated in a risk
assessment must be an ascertainable risk; theoretical uncertainty is 'not the kind of risk which,
under Aiticle 5.1, is to be assessed.' This does not mean, however, that a Member cannot
determine its own appropriate level of protection to be 'zero risk'." Id. $ 125 (footnote omitted).
See Victor, supra note 11, at 311-12:
The Appellate Body's reading of the SPS Agreement gives a member state a much
broader ability to raise its standards above the level set by international standards, as
long as it possesses sufficient scientific evidence. This more generous authority to
raise standards is subject to review by dispute settlement panels and is limited by the
requirement that a "rational substantive relationship exist between the risk assessment
and the measure adopted."
See also Jacob, supra note 46, at 89. "[E]xisting international law allows a country to take
action based on any scientific indication of a potential risk, even if there are significant
uncertainties associated with it." Id.
82. See Australia-Measures, supra note 79, at $ 134.
83. See Victor, supra note 11, at 307 (footnotes omitted):
The establishment of the [SPS Agreement] allows WTO members to impose stronger
measures, but only when there is sufficient "scientific justification" to support a
member's determination that there is a need for stricter standards. This requirement is
intended to prevent agricultural protectionism by a WTO member who may be seeking
to evade its free trade commitments to other member countries. The existence of a
verifiable standard removes the ability of a member country to inhibit free trade by a
mere assertion unsupported by science.
84. See SPS Agreement, supra note 74, at Art. 5(5). The nondiscrimination principle
would, for example, bar a nation from adopting SPS measures that accept higher levels of risk
from domestic products than from similar imported products. See Christopher D. Stone, Is
There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,790, 10,799 (2001). The SPS
Agreement:
suggests a compromising tactic: a member invoking distinctive national risk concerns
as a basis for refusal to import a potentially hazardous agent is allowed leeway in the
level of border protection it selects, as long as it applies nondiscriminatorily
comparable levels of risk protection across the board, including domestically.
Id. (footnote omitted). For a description of the course of events in Europe, compare Victor,
supra note 11, at 304.
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regime thus ensures that trade limiting SPS measures are grounded in
85articulable safety concerns and are not motivated by protectionism.
The AIA procedure adopted in the Protocol appears consistent
with the requirements of the SPS Agreement. A state's decision to
limit the import of LMO's must be based on a risk assessment but
may be made notwithstanding uncertain evidence of risk.86
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant
scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of
the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in
the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human
health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as
appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified
organism in question as referred to in paragraph 3 above, in
order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.87
On June 25, 1999, the Council recommended that Directive 901220 be amended to
adopt a precautionary approach that prevents the authorization of a GMO until there is
positive proof that it does not affect human health or the environment. All the member
states of the EU agreed to follow this approach. Despite the member states' assertion
that they would enforce the moratorium, seven member states have simultaneously
proposed eleven new GMO products for authorization. As a result of the inconsistency
in enforcement of GMO regulation between the national governments and the
supranational EU government, people have no reliable information on whether these
governmental bodies are protecting consumers or industry; thus the European public
has little confidence in regulatory authorities.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
85. The requirements defined by the SPS Agreement are analagous to the rules governing
trade within the European Communities. In Commission of the European Communities v.
French Republic, the European Court held that France was not permitted to ban the sale of
British beef because of a concern about the risks of bovine spongiform encephalopathy that was
not supported by adequate scientific evidence. Comm'n of the European Cmtys. v. French
Republic, Case C-100 (Dec. 13, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int (last visited Feb. 11,
2002). The requirements of the SPS Agreement also appear analogous to the requirement of
domestic law that a government not base its decision-making on irrational fears. See City of
Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see also Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891) (holding that dormant
commerce clause prevents local limits on trade that are unrelated to health or environmental
risks).
86. Protocol, supra note 2, atArt. 10(6).
87. Id. This provision applies to LMOs intended to be introduced into the environment of
the Party of import. Id. at Art. 7(1). Identical language is included in the requirements for
decision-making regarding LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed or for processing. Id.
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This language seems consistent with the application of the
precautionary principle that now undergirds much of international, as
well as domestic, environmental law.8 8 Nevertheless, the Protocol's
language has been criticized on the ground that it demands too much
scientific evidence of risk before a State may bar the import of
LMOs. Professor McCaffrey has written that
[t]he risk management provisions authorize precautionary
action only if the scientific uncertainty concerns the "extent"
of the potential adverse effects of LMOs. Unless interpreted
otherwise by the parties, this requirement would significantly
narrow the effectiveness of the provisions on precaution. As
one commentator has observed, "[I]n the case of the risks
associated with LMOs, it is uncertain[ty] regarding the if and
how, rather than the extent, of the risk, that is likely to be
primarily at stake."89
This concern grows when the final version of the Protocol is
contrasted with an earlier draft, which appears to limit the nature of
the required scientific evidence.90
at Art. 11(8).
88. See Michael P. Healy, England's Contaminated Land Act of 1995: Perspectives on
America's Approach to Hazardous Substance Cleanups And Evolving Principles of
International Law, 13 J. NAT. REsOURCES & ENVTL. L. 289, 291-92 (1997-98) (describing
precautionary principle). One commentator has argued that the Protocol's adoption of the
principle is especially emphatic. See Stoll, supra note 45, at 97:
mhe Biosafety Protocol, unlike the Basel and PIC Conventions, not only places the
precautionary principle in prominent positions in its preamble and objectives
provisions (Article I) but also builds it directly into the operative provisions on risk
assessment. The recognition and legal expression of the precautionary principle as
highlighted in these provisions can be considered an important and genuine
achievement.
89. McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 98 (footnote omitted); see also Jacob, supra note 46, at
87. "What [the Protocol] says regarding the extent of potential adverse effects is important. By
implication, this suggests that we have some scientific information to indicate that there is an
adverse effect. Frankly, this suggestion is very much in dispute right now with respect to
LMOs, particularly in certain applications." Id.; see also Stoll, supra note 45, at 116 (according
to the Protocol, "precautionary action will only be authorized if the lack of certainty concerns
the 'extent' of the adverse effect. The provision thereby implies that all other aspects and
especially the source or origin of the adverse effect have to be certain.").
90. Jacob, supra note 46, at 88:
The version that appeared in the Pre-Montreal draft text (Article 8.7) read, "[lack of
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To the extent, however, that a threshold requirement under the
WTO regime already compels some evidence of risk before a trade
restriction may be imposed,91 the final Protocol language is less
controversial. There will necessarily be an extent of the risk issue,
rather than an existence of the risk issue, regarding the basis for a
permissible trade restricting decision. For this reason, a different
issue regarding the effect of the Protocol seems more significant.
How does the agreement address the insufficiency of information for
the risk management determination? Indeed, commentators have
urged that the question of which party bears the burden of adducing
scientific evidence relating to the risks of LMOs is critical.92
With respect to this issue, the Protocol can be read to allocate the
burden of coming forward with scientific evidence of safety to the
exporting nation based on the preference of the importing nation.
Although the Protocol does not include express language authorizing
trade restrictions when scientific evidence is not available, 93 several
full scientific certainty or scientific consensus regarding the potential adverse effects
of a living modified organism shall not prevent the Party of import from prohibiting
the import of the living modified organism in question." This was somewhat more
direct. The difference in the final result is going to invite challenge and confusion and
we would have preferred not to see that difference.
91. For a description of this requirement of the SPS Agreement, see supra notes 79-80
and accompanying text.
92. See McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 98 (footnote omitted):
[The big question in terms of trade in GMOs is who should bear the burden-i.e., the
burden of showing whether the GMO in question is dangerous to human health or the
environment. Specifically, should the country exporting GMOs have to establish that
they are safe or at least that they do not pose unacceptable dangers? Or must the
importing country do so before it will be allowed to keep them out? It may be very
difficult to carry this burden because the precise risks posed by most GMOs are not
fully understood. Allocation of the burden may therefore determine whether the GM
goods move across borders or not.
See also de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 173:
mhe precautionary principle and the principle of 'scientific evidence' would be
compatible if the burden of proof shifted. Thus, the new legislation in terms of GMP
simply should (a) first, allow any country to take a restrictive measure (label, ban or
moratorium, or minimal standard) based on the precautionary principle, and (b)
second, allow any country suffering the economic consequences of this measure to
challenge the same, and this country would be responsible for proving scientifically
that the GMP is absolutely safe to the environment and to human beings, so the change
would mean only a shift in the burden of proof.
93. Other international agreements do include explicit provisions allowing regulatory
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provisions relating to the risk assessment support this reading. First,
the Protocol states that the "[f]ack of scientific knowledge or
scientific consensus should not necessarily be interpreted as
indicating a particular level of risk, an absence of risk, or an
acceptable risk., 94  Such a gap in information is accordingly
consistent with any of those conclusions. The Protocol also
recognizes that a need for additional information may become
controls in such circumstances. Article 715(4) of the North American Free Trade Agreement
provides that:
where a Party conducting a risk assessment determines that available relevant
scientific evidence or other information is insufficient to complete the assessment, it
may adopt a provisional sanitary or phytosanitary measure on the basis of available
relevant information, including from international or North American standardizing
organizations and from sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Parties. The Party
shall, within a reasonable period after information sufficient to complete the
assessment is presented to it, complete its assessment, review and where appropriate,
revise the provisional measure in the light of the assessment.
32 I.L.M. 289, 379 (1993); see also Robert Housman, The North American Free Trade
Agreement's Lessons for Reconciling Trade and the Environment, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 379,
405 (1994) (footnotes omitted), who has written that:
NAFTA also break[s] new ground for the formation of trade policy by explicitly
recognizing the precautionary principle of environmental law. [Its provisions] allow
the NAFTA parties leeway to adopt environmental, health and safety measures where
the scientific evidence is insufficient to determine the actual risk posed by a given
product or service. Whereas the other NAFTA standards provisions, discussed above,
provide leeway for environmental protections where the science is conflicting, these
precautionary provisions provide leeway where the science is incomplete.
Moreover, Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement includes a similar provision regarding insufficient
information:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available
pertinent information, including that from the relevant international organizations as
well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such
circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a
more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure
accordingly within a reasonable period of time.
SPS Agreement, supra note 74, at Art. 5.7. In Japan, the Appellate Body concluded that Japan
failed to comply with the provisional measures provision because "Japan did not seek to obtain
the additional information necessary for a more objective risk assessment," and "Japan has not
reviewed its varietal testing requirement 'within a reasonable period of time."' Measures
Affecting Agricultural Products, World Trade Organization Appellate Body, WT/DS76/AB/R
-H 92, 93 (Feb. 22, 1999).
94. 39 I.L.M. 1027, 1045 (2000).
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apparent in the consideration of a risk assessment.95 It also grants the
importing nation authority to request the submission of such
information. 96 Moreover, the Protocol recognizes an important
context for additional information, because it realizes the significance
of release of LMOs into an environment in which release had not
previously occurred.97 Finally, the Protocol recognizes the ability of
the importing nation to seek additional information in a case of
"uncertainty regarding the level of risk" as an alternative to a
decision to permit the import of the LMO with a monitoring
requirement.
98
Interpreting the Protocol to permit an importing nation to allocate
the burden of adducing scientific evidence to support the release of
LMOs to the exporting nation offers several important benefits. First,
this allocation creates a strong incentive for the development of
relevant scientific evidence, 99 especially in the United States. Under
domestic law, the procedures mandated by the National
Environmental Policy Act for government actions that significantly
affect the environment help develop information important to public
policy making.100 In a far different context, the formal method of
95. Id. "The process of risk assessment may ... give rise to a need for further information
about specific subjects, which may be identified and requested during the assessment process
.... "Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1046 (requiring that risk assessment include "[information on the location,
geographical, climatic and ecological characteristics, including relevant information on
biological diversity and centres of origin of the likely potential receiving environment").
98. Id. "Where there is uncertainty regarding the level of risk, it may be addressed by
requesting further information on the specific issues of concern or by implementing appropriate
risk management strategies and/or monitoring the living modified organism in the receiving
environment." Id.
99. The clearinghouse mechanism established by the Protocol should further these values
as well. See Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 20.
100. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, in which the court concluded that the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) violated the National Environmental Policy Act when it
approved the first experimental release of a genetically modified organism into the
environment. 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The court concluded that the
NIH must first complete a far more adequate environmental assessment of the possible
environmental impact of the deliberate release experiment than it has yet undertaken.
That assessment must "provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining
whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant
impact," 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1). Ignoring possible environmental consequences will
not suffice. Nor will a mere conclusory statement that the number of recombinant-
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interpreting statutes is defended in part because it induces the
disclosure of information.'01 Creating new incentives for the
development of information about LMOs is important because the
United States, as the principal exporter of LMOs, is not obligated by
domestic law to develop such information.1
0 2
DNA-containing organisms will be small and subject to processes limiting survival.
Instead, NIH must attempt to evaluate seriously the risk that emigration of such
organisms from the test site will create ecological disruption. Second, until NIH
completes such an evaluation the question whether the experiment requires an EIS
remains open. The University of California experiment clearly presents the possibility
of a problem identified by NIH in its EIS as a potential environmental hazard. This
fact weighs heavily in support of the view that an EIS should be completed, unless
NIH can demonstrate either that the experiment does not pose the previously identified
danger, or that its assessment of the previously identified danger has changed through
a process of reasoned decision-making. Nor is it sufficient for the agency merely to
state that the environmental effects are currently unknown. Indeed, one of the specific
criteria for determining whether an EIS is necessary is "[tihe degree to which the
possible effects on the human environment as highly uncertain or involve unique or
unknown risks." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5).
756 F.2d at 154-55.
101. Professor Sunstein has written that
[i]t seems most straightforward to defend formalism as a massive or global
information-eliciting default rule. Perhaps formalism is likely to produce greater
clarity from Congress, precisely because it ensures that statutory language will be
understood by reference to its terms. Thus the notion that statutes will be taken in their
"plain meaning" might be understood as a way of encouraging Congress to speak
unambiguously.
Cass R. Sunstein, Formalism and Statutory Interpretation: Must Formalism Be Defended
Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 636,655 (1999).
102. See Victor, supra note 11, at 304. "The United States has no major laws regulating
GMOs." Id. (footnote omitted); see also McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 93. "[I]t does not appear
that the agencies [with regulatory authority relevant to GMOs] have yet succeeded in
coordinating their activities in this area, so that what regulation there is of genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) is far from seamless." ld.
[A]s concerns the United States, based on media reports which suggest a rather passive
attitude on the part of U.S. regulatory agencies, I would have to answer that it does not
appear that the United States is in fact "tak[ing] all appropriate measures" to prevent or
minimize the risk of significant transboundary harm from GMOs.
Id. at 100.
Professor McCaffrey provides the following example of the very limited regulatory
requirements in the United States.
The USDA admitted that its system for evaluating applications for genetically
engineered plants was still "evolving." It accepted studies by the proponent of the new
plant, and those studies are often-even in the most critical cases-sub-par. For
example, in the crookneck squash case, only fourteen of the weeds related to the
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The allocation of the burden to produce information permitted by
the Protocol is also defensible because the Protocol so far lacks a
liability regime. In a context in which harm may not be remedied if it
occurs to an importing nation, that nation should have greater
opportunity to ensure the safety of LMO imports.0 3
Finally, the Protocol's discretionary allocation of the burden to
produce information responds to the national differences among
importing states regarding risk concerns. 1°4 A state with greater
proposed squash were actually studied to determine whether its population would be
kept in check by the virus that the new plant would be immune to-an immunity that
could spread from the new, supersquash to the weeds, making them superweeds. As
one scientist observed, the fact that none of the weeds studied had the virus could just
as well be due to the virus having wiped out all the weeds it had encountered. If so, the
spread of the immunity from the new squash to the weedy cousin would be a real
problem. In fact, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) found that the USDA did
not have an adequate scientific basis for its approval of the squash. In what some
would consider to be an understatement, one member of the NAS panel opined that:
"There needs to be some caution here."
Id. at 98 (footnotes omitted); cf. GAO, Environmental Information: EPA Is Taking Steps to
Improve Information Management, but Challenges Remain, at 5 (Sept. 1999 GAO/RCED-99-
261) (describing how EPA regulates despite "extensive data gaps [that] are a result both of a
lack of fundamental scientific knowledge and of inadequate data collection"). But cf. Kupehella,
supra note 12, at 730-31. "No statutes exist in the United States that address biotechnology
specifically. However, there is a very comprehensive process to evaluate genetically modified
products for risks to human, animal, and plant health and for environmental safety." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
103. See Stone, supra note 84, at 10,798 (footnotes omitted):
One can conjure circumstances in which uncompensated risk-shifting could be
defended. Nonetheless, the presumptions against it find support on grounds both of
economic efficiency and intuitive fairness. The impact of uncompensated harms can
and of course should be reduced by fortifying the law's compensation mechanisms.
But as long as the prospect of settling up ex post are limited, there is all the more
warrant to foster precautionary mechanisms ex ante. How far, is hard to say.
Mechanisms that stifle externalities find favor, as do those that build on information-
forcing and consent. For example, when the risk accompanies a commodity in transit,
boundary crossing can be conditioned on the risk receiver's consent, as under the prior
informed consent provisions of the Basel Convention and Cartagena Protocol.
104. Professor Stone has written that:
There remains, however, a set of cases in which more risk information, alone, will not
reduce and reconcile conflicting evaluations of the uneliminated risks. In the tumult
over LGMOs, for example, the opposition arises not merely from diverging
interpretations of the limited empirical data. Conflicting national and cultural values
are involved, including control over what we eat, and attitudes toward science,
sovereignty, and capitalism. And different evaluations-different risk targets, with
differing willingness to "take the risk"---can arise out of differences in wealth. As one
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concerns should have the ability to withhold a final decision until
information about risks and benefits is available. Of course, a state
that is risk averse and requires more information must apply that
same approach to domestic products under the principle of
nondiscrimination.
In sum, the Protocol appears consistent with the regime of
international trade regulation by requiring that scientific evidence
show a risk posed by LMOs before an importing nation is authorized
to bar their import. The Protocol, however, arguably permits the
importing nation to allocate the burden to demonstrate a lack of risks
to the exporting nation.
105
commentator has said of the Bergen Declaration: "One person's unacceptable
consequence' is another's regrettable necessity."
Stone, supra note 84, at 10,798 (footnotes omitted).
Stone also noted that
sometimes the intuition that we ought to be cautious reflects an awareness that
different people (and in the international context, nations), react to risks differently.
Sometimes the risks are objectively different.... In other circumstances, variations in
risk assessment may largely reflect differences in the degree to which the available
data and recommendations of experts (ordinarily Western) are trusted.
Id. at 10,798 (emphasis omitted).
Commentators have noted the significant differences in the perception of risks associated
with LMOs in the United States as compared to Europe. See de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15,
at 142-43 (footnotes omitted):
In the USA, GMP will be considered safe, unless there is actual proof against this
assumption, and if the GMP is safe, the food is also safe and there is no need for
special label indicating that the food originated from GMP. On the other hand, the
position in EU is that the GMP and its products are considered unsafe, unless there is
clear proof against this assumption, and if the food is not safe 'a priori' the consumer
must be protected through a special label.
Cf. Victor, supra note 11, at 309. "In a statement to EU officials last fall, U.S. Commerce
Undersecretary David Aaron claimed that because the EU did not have the scientific grounds to
reject products containing GMOs, it had resorted to 'a variety of ploys and political maneuvers
to delay and deny' the product's approval." Id. (footnote omitted).
105. The consistency of this aspect of the Protocol with the GATT's regime may depend on
whether the importing country is seen as having adopted a provisional measure pending the
receipt of additional information. See supra note 93. One commentator has written that
a conflict in which the respective parties belong to both instruments will most likely be
resolved in favor of the Biosafety Protocol, as it is the more specific (lex specialis) and
the most recent agreement (lex posterior). In the case of a non-party to the protocol,
the SPS Agreement will prevail.
Stoll, supra note 45, at 117.
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IV. INFORMATION DISCLosURE AND INFORMED CONSENT OF
PRODUCT PURCHASERS
The Protocol's regulatory approach to LMOs intended for food,
feed, or processing differs from the AJA approach that applies to
LMOs intended for release into the environment. The importing
country has authority to bar the initial import of genetically modified
food products 0 6 and there must be "documentation accompanying"
the LMOs stating that the product "may contain" LMOs. t0 7 By
imposing this requirement, the Protocol accepts the need for a
disclosure requirement despite the fact that the importing nation has
not found a product risk that warrants a prohibition against import.
This Article considers whether this requirement is consistent with the
international trade regime and whether the requirement yields
important policy benefits.
The Protocol is ambiguous about who will have a chance to
review the required documentation. Details of the requirement, which
will be discussed as a "labeling requirement," are to be identified
within two years. 108 The Article assumes that the purchaser to whom
the product information is disclosed includes the ultimate
consumer. 10 9 To the extent only retailers receive the product
information, the requirement will be seen as more or less defensible
depending on the nature of the risks of the LMOs.
In order to evaluate the legality and the advisability of the labeling
requirement, this Article sets forth three hypothetical contexts in
which the requirement would apply. First, an importing nation may
decide that the import of LMO food products results in definite
articulable risks. The importing nation may nevertheless decide to
106. See Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 7(3).
107. Id. at Art. 18(2)(a). LMOs that are intended for release into the environment must
meet more definitive labeling requirements. Such items must be "clearly identifie[d]" as LMOs.
Id. at Art. 18(2)(c).
108. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
109. In describing the implementation of Article 18, the Intergovernmental Committee for
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety has plainly considered the issue of product labeling for use
by consumers. See Intergovernmental Committee for the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafet;
Handing, Transport, Packaging and Identification (Article 18), at 8-14 (UNEPICBDIICCPIlI6)
(Sept. 25, 2000) (reviewing international and national requirements relating to labeling of LMO
food products).
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permit import of the products because it does not pursue a zero risk
policy regarding LMOs. Second, the importing nation may be quite
uncertain about the risks of LMO food products after analyzing the
risk assessments for the products, which may lack probative scientific
studies of effects. The importing nation may decide to permit the
import of the products, notwithstanding its uncertainty about product
risks. Third, the importing nation may allow import of the LMO
products based on its conclusions that the risk assessment shows that
the product does not cause any risks.'10 With these different scenarios
in mind, this Article now considers the legality of the labeling
requirement.
Because labeling is a type of SPS measure,"' its consistency with
the international trade regime is assessed by reference to the
requirements of the SPS Agreement. As previously discussed, 112 that
agreement imposes two requirements for SPS measures. First, there
must be a reasonable, articulable risk of harm associated with the fact
that the food product is genetically modified for the label to be
acceptable. Second, the importing state has to apply the requirement
in a nondiscriminatory manner by requiring such labeling of
genetically modified domestic food products. Under the first
hypothetical scenario, the importing nation concludes that an
identifiable risk is present and allows the import nonetheless. As long
as that nation conforms to the nondiscrimination requirement, its
labeling requirement is permissible and is less restrictive than a ban
on importation. Under the second hypothetical scenario, again
assuming nondiscrimination, the labeling requirement arguably
conforms to the SPS Agreement. Allowing the import of labeled
LMO products seems less restrictive than barring import until more
certain scientific studies are available. In the previous part, the article
explains how the Protocol arguably permits such an action by the
110. There are, of course, significant uncertainties relating to the risks of LMOs. The risks
that the release of LMOs poses to genetically-rich ecosystems may not have been tested. See
supra note 37. Also, risks to human health posed to human health are quite difficult to identify
and necessarily uncertain. See supra notes 39-42. This third, zero-risk category may
accordingly be nonexistent.
I 11. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
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importing nation in conformity with the SPS Agreement.! 3 Indeed,
the Protocol's labeling requirement appears to reflect a generic
decision by its Parties that the uncertainties associated with LMOs
establish at least a minimum level of articulable risk. Under the third
scenario, however, the labeling requirement would undoubtedly
violate the SPS Agreement. If an importing nation decides that an
LMO food product poses no articulable risk, a label identifying the
product as genetically modified would be unwarranted as an SPS
measure.
There are also several public policy bases for the labeling
requirement that merit consideration. By mandating labeling of LMO
food products, the Protocol imposes an information disclosure
requirement that is independent of, but has the effect of
supplementing, the regulatory scheme for consent to importation-a
type of command and control regulation. 14 This supplementary role
of information disclosure is consistent with the increasingly
important role of information disclosure in environmental regulation.
Regarding the import of LMOs, the governmental regulation related
to permitted imports in the first two hypothetical scenarios does not
entirely eliminate the risks associated with importation: The decision
of the importing state in the first two scenarios does not reflect a zero
risk standard, either because there is an established, known risk
associated with the LMOs or because the uncertainties of the risk
mean that use of the product imposes a risk of an uncertain extent on
consumers. The label in these two circumstances accordingly gives
individual consumers an opportunity to make their own decisions
about voluntary exposure to the residual, nonzero product risks. In
113. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
114. See de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 163-64 (footnotes omitted):
Labels... do not impose any internal requirement on the product. They only impose
an external requirement in terms of information: some information about the product
must be attached to the product. So, labeling has three basic functions: (a) it informs
the consumer that some product is more or less dangerous to the consumer's health
(making consumers more aware of the risks of the product), or to the environment
(e.g., the voluntary European Eco-Label); (b) it protects consumers through a clear and
honest exposure to the existing risks relating to the product; and (c) it allows
consumers to make intentional choices, so if a similar product exists (in terms of
characteristics, performance, taste, price and so on) it will enable the consumer to
choose among them or opt for a substitute product.
20023
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the third, very rare circumstance, in which the importing nation
determines that no articulable risk is present, there is no reason for a
label since there would be no risk for the consumer to consider.
In the United States, the government requires regulated entities to
provide the government with information that will be disclosed to the
public as an alternative or supplement to traditional command and
control regulatory requirements. The government first took this
approach in the required annual Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). 115
Another important example is California's Proposition 65, which
requires warnings by companies of exposure to identified toxic
substances. 16 A final example is the federal mandate, included in the
1996 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act,117 that "each
community water system [] mail to each customer of the system at
least once annually a report on the level of contaminants in the
drinking water purveyed by that system."
'" 8
Among the required contents for these "consumer confidence
reports" is the following information.
If any regulated contaminant is detected in the water purveyed
by the public water system, a statement setting forth (I) the
maximum contaminant level goal, (II) the maximum
contaminant level, (III) the level of such contaminant in such
water system, and (IV) for any regulated contaminant for
which there has been a violation of the maximum contaminant
level during the year concerned, the brief statement in plain
language regarding the health concerns that resulted in
regulation of such contaminant .... "'
All three of these regulatory regimes require companies to report
releases of, or exposure to, pollutants, regardless of whether the
release or exposure is permitted under the command and control
regulations of polluting activities. Other nations have begun to
115. The reporting requirement is prescribed in 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (Supp. 1999). See
generally Bradley C. Karkainnen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEo. L.J. 257,289 (2001).
116. Seeid. at345-47.
117. Safe Drinking Water Acts Amendments, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (1996).
118. Id. § 114(a) (codified at42 U.S.C. 300g-3(c)(4)(A) (2000)).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(4)(B).
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impose similar information disclosure obligations 120 and have already
proposed or adopted labeling requirements for LMO food products.
121
The United States, which arguably began this regulatory approach
when it imposed the TRI requirement, so far has imposed no such
labeling requirements for LMOs.1
22
An important consequence of this regulatory approach is that the
required disclosure of information may change the behavior of the
regulated entity even in the absence of command and control
regulatory requirements. For example, in the view of many observers,
the success of the TRI has been great, yielding reductions in reported
emissions of almost fifty percent that go beyond reductions mandated
by the EPA's command and control requirements. 123 These beneficial
environmental results have been accomplished, moreover, at costs to
the agency and regulated entities that appear to be much lower than
the administrative and compliance costs associated with command
and control regulations. 124 Similarly, consumer attitudes about the
safety of GMOs might change if the government required labeling for
LMO products. 125 The reduced level of demand for and production of
120. See generally Karkainnen, supra note 115, at 347-50.
121. See Mike Kepp, Cardoso Inks Brazilian GM Labeling Decree; Green Consumer
Groups Seek Revocation, 24 Int'l Envtil. Rep. (BNA) 661 (2001); Joe Kirwin, EU Proposes
Strict GMO Labeling Rule; Action Likely to Aggravate U.S. Concerns, 24 Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) 639 (2001); Shai Oster, China Issues New Rules to Ensure Safety, Labeling, Licensing
of GMO Crop Activities, 24 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 519 (2001).
122. See Victor, supra note 11, at 306 (footnotes omitted):
The FDA only requires labeling of genetically-modified foods if the composition of
the food differs significantly from the food from which it was derived or if it may pose
a health threat. The U.S. Congress may consider a bill for the mandatory labeling of
foods containing GMOs, similar to the EU's "Novel Food Regulation." However, the
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture has stated that federal requirements for labeling are
unlikely.
The lack of a labeling requirement does not reflect a lack of consumer interest in such
information. See de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 144. "[Eighty-five percent] of Americans
considered the labeling of GMF very important, according to the United States Department of
Agriculture, and 99% desire a clear identification in the label indicating that the product is a
GMF." Id. (footnote omitted).
123. See Karkainnen, supra note 115, at 287-88.
124. See id. at 291-92. The costs of TRI for reporting entities are hardly trivial, however, as
can be seen by the EPA's estimates of the significant costs associated with expanding the scope
of TRI reporting. See William F. Pedersen, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel
Universes and Beyond, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 189 (2001).
125. A recent poll made the following findings.
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these products would then presumably last until producers are able to
demonstrate product safety to consumers. 126 In this respect, the
labeling requirement creates an incentive for interested companies or
nations to develop information that will convince consumers that
their products pose no risk.12 7 If this incentive generates substantial
new information about the risks associated with LMO food products,
then that information could lead to a confident determination that
risks are not posed by the products. In this manner, the labeling
requirement for the second category of decisions to allow importation
could come to be inconsistent with the theory of supplementary
Consumers' attitudes and purchasing behavior would be affected by GE food labels.
About 30% of consumers stated that GE-labeled foods were "not as safe" as or were
"worse" than identical foods without such label information. In addition, 40% to 43%
of those surveyed would buy products labeled "genetically engineered," while 52% of
consumers would choose a product labeled "does not contain genetically engineered
ingredients" over a product labeled that it does "contain" such ingredients. In other
words, the poll indicates that many consumers would favor non-GE foods because
straightforward label statements about GE or non-GE implies to them that non-GE
foods are better and safer than comparable GE foods ....
Center for Science in the Public Interest, National Opinion Poll on Labeling of Genetically
Engineered Foods 1 (May 15, 2001), available at http:I/www.cspinet.org/reports/op_poll
labeling.html) (last visited Feb. 10, 2002); see also Schweizer, supra note 8, at 582 n.29.
Consumers have shied away from purchasing these products because of environmental
and health concerns, making it difficult for farmers to market their genetically altered
products. As a result, a recent poll of 400 farmers conducted at the annual meeting of
the American Farm Bureau Federation indicated that there might be a 24 percent
decline in plantings of Bt corn compared with last year.
Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 158.
"[A] recent survey [in Brazil] supported by the newspaper '0 GLOBO' concerning GMF
showed that: 44% believe that GMF is not healthy, 38% had no opinion about the subject, and
18% considered GMF not harmful to health." Id. (footnote omitted); see also Victor, supra note
11, at 296.
The concomitant effect of a lack of faith in science upon the acceptance of science is
especially evident in the backlash against genetically altered foods in Europe. In
reaction to the fear generated by the outbreak of madcow disease in the early 1990s,
European consumers have a great lack of trust for additives, modem livestock-feeding
techniques, and biotechnology in general.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
126. Lost sales resulting from consumer preferences are not the only costs of a labeling
requirement. The labeling requirement could force food suppliers to develop supply methods
that separate LMO from non-LMO products. See Kupchella, supra note 12, at 736.
127. This incentive would reinforce another incentive already created by the AIA
procedure discussed in supra Part HlI.
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information based regulation, as there would not be any residual risk
for the consumer to consider.
A second reason to impose the labeling requirement for LMO
food products is that the Protocol provides for a differential regime
for individual, as opposed to governmental, decision-making. A
requirement that LMO food products be labeled, even though the
importing state decides that they are sufficiently safe to import,
reflects an important and coherent difference between the quality of
information required for the government's food safety determinations
and the quality of information required for a consumer's food safety
decision-making. For example, if domestic policy relating to tobacco
is coherent, it is because our polity has concluded that the
government need not ban sales of tobacco because the public is well
advised of the risks associated with product use, based at least in part
on product labeling. Adult individuals are given the power and
responsibility to choose whether to expose themselves to the
product's risks. Government can reduce the need for paternalistic
regulations by requiring disclosure of product risks and by allowing
individuals to decide for themselves whether risks are too high. This
approach may also result in more rational government decision-
making about risk prevention.
12 8
The extent to which this rationale supports the Protocol's labeling
requirement is less certain than the first rationale. With respect to
both the first and second hypothetical scenarios, a risk is either
known to be present or is presumptively present due to uncertain
scientific evidence. To allow individual decision-making in these
contexts would be consistent with the reason for the differential
regime for decision-making. The Protocol requirement is, however,
flawed with respect to this rationale. To the extent that the LMO food
product does impose risks, the Protocol's watered down label
requirement, the "may contain" language, impedes the individual's
ability to make an informed choice about purchasing the product.
128. If a state opts for the zero risk approach, then the issue of risk based labeling does not
arise because the products may not be imported. This has occurred under the European
regulatory regime. That regime provides for labeling of genetically modified products, but such
products have not been approved for sale because of safety concerns. See Kupchella, supra note
12, at 732-33.
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Moreover, a paradox emerges regarding LMOs. The risks that are
likely to motivate the consumer's decisions about risk exposure, such
as risks to the health of the consumer and the consumer's family, may
not be the risks that the products pose from the perspective of the
importing nation, such as risks to biodiversity. 129 Moreover, the
significant ecosystem risks that LMOs may pose arise principally in
the nation in which the LMO food products were grown, rather than
in the importing nation. 130 This latter point may not foreclose a nation
from imposing SPS requirements,1 31 but consumers are unlikely to
129. The risks associated with LMOs are described insupra Part I.
130. But cf supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing situation in Mexico, in which
native corn may have been contaminated by LMOs distributed as food products).
131. In United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO
Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), the Appellate Body discussed whether
GATT permitted a nation to adopt trade restrictions based on impacts on "exhaustible
resources," endangered sea turtles in that case, located outside of the importing nation's
jurisdiction. Its conclusion in that case did not definitively resolve the issue.
The sea turtle species here at stake ... are all known to occur in waters over which the
United States exercises jurisdiction. Of course, it is not claimed that all populations of
these species migrate to, or traverse, at one time or another, waters subject to United
States jurisdiction. Neither the appellate nor any of the appellees claims any rights of
exclusive ownership over the sea turtles, at least not while they are swimming freely in
their natural habitat-the oceans. We do not pass upon the question of whether there is
an implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of
that limitation. We note only that in the specific circumstances of the case before us,
there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine populations
involved and the United States for purposes of Article XX(g).
Id. 133 (footnote omitted).
An earlier GATT Panel, applying the terms of GATT 1947, considered inter alia, the
permissibility of a "Dolphin Safe" label requirement based on the tuna fishing practices of the
exporting nation. See Report of the GATT Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna
DS21/R-39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991):
5.42 The Panel proceeded to examine the subsidiary argument by Mexico that the
labelling provisions of the [Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA)]
were inconsistent with Article I:l because they discriminated against Mexico as a
country fishing in the [Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP)]. The Panel noted that the
labelling provisions of the DPCIA do not restrict the sale of tuna products; tuna
products can be sold freely both with and without the "Dolphin Safe" label. Nor do
these provisions establish requirements that have to be met in order to obtain an
advantage from the government. Any advantage which might possibly result from
access to this label depends on the free choice by consumers to give preference to tuna
carrying the "Dolphin Safe" label. The labelling provisions therefore did not make the
right to sell tuna or tuna products, nor the access to a government-conferred advantage
affecting the sale of tuna or tuna products, conditional upon the use of tuna harvesting
methods. The only issue before the Panel was therefore whether the provisions of the
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contemplate such risks when making decisions about whether to
purchase the products. In sum, under the first two scenarios, the
labeling requirement arguably reflects a proper distinction between
the consideration of risk at the national and individual levels. The
requirement would be even more defensible if the public more clearly
understood the nature of the risks posed by LMOs as food products.
The watered down label prescribed by the Protocol is, however,
contrary to the second rationale.
With respect to the third scenario that requires a label despite a
decision to allow product imports based on a finding of no risk, the
rationale of differential regimes for decision-making is inapplicable.
Once the government has determined that a product poses no risks, it
is incoherent to require a label that would allow individual decision-
making based on concerns about the product that have no basis in
DPCIA governing the right of access to the label met the requirements of Article 1:1.
5A3 The Panel noted that the DPCIA is based inter alia on a finding that dolphins
are frequently killed in the course of tuna-fishing operations in the ETP through the
use of purse-seine nets intentionally deployed to encircle dolphins. The DPCIA
therefore accords the right to use the label "Dolphin Safe" for tuna harvested in the
ETP only if such tuna is accompanied by documentary evidence showing that it was
not harvested with purse-seine nets intentionally deployed to encircle dolphins. The
Panel examined whether this requirement applied to tuna from the ETP was consistent
with Article 1:1. According to the information presented to the Panel, the harvesting of
tuna by intentionally encircling dolphins with purse-seine nets was practised only in
the ETP because of the particular nature of the association between dolphins and tuna
observed only in that area. By imposing the requirement to provide evidence that this
fishing technique had not been used in respect of tuna caught in the ETP the United
States therefore did not discriminate against countries fishing in this area .... The
labelling regulations governing tuna caught in the ETP thus applied to all countries
whose vessels fished in this geographical area and thus did not distinguish between
products originating in Mexico and products originating in other countries.
The Panel accordingly concluded that the labeling requirement was not barred by GATT. See
id. 7.3.
It is important to recognize that, as the concerns about the risks inhering in the product
being labeled become less connected to the jurisdiction of the nation imposing the label
requirement, the labeling arguably relates solely to the product's process and production
methods, rather than risks to the safety of the importing nation. The legality of such eco-
labeling is determined by reference to the GATT's Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT Agreement). See http://www.wto.org/englishldocs-ellegal-elfina-e.htm (last visited Feb.
7, 2002) for the text of the TBT Agreement. The issue of the permissibility of such labeling
under the TBT Agreement is a controversial one. See, e.g., DAVID HUNTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLIcY 1182-84 (2d ed. 2002). That issue is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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fact. 132 A regulatory regime that bars a nation from limiting the
import of a product that imposes no risks should not require product
labeling that would allow, if not encourage, product decisions by
consumers that are irrational given the lack of a showing of product
risk.133 An analogy to the circumstances of the City of Cleburne
134
case may illustrate this point. There, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a local government acted unlawfully when its zoning
discriminated against a group home for the retarded on the basis of
concerns about the residents of such a home that were shown to have
no basis in fact.135 In such a circumstance, it would be similarly
unacceptable to force the home to label itself as a home for the
retarded with the result that neighborhood residents would act upon
their baseless concerns about the home's residents.
A third and fimal context for assessing the advisability of the
labeling requirement is to compare it to another labeling requirement
that is accepted by the international trade regime. The terms of GATT
expressly permit country of origin labeling. 136 Country of origin
labeling allows consumers to preferentially select products of
domestic origin. 137 Interestingly, the United States requires country of
132. Few, if any, LMOs, of course, will fall within this third category. See supra note 110.
Labeling of zero-risk LMOs may arguably be defended as an indicator of the product's process
and production methods. See supra note 131.
133. Cf. Center for Science in the Public Interest, supra note 125. "The survey found that
approximately 40% of consumers believe that GE-related labeling reflects upon the quality and
safety of the food, even though many scientists and regulatory agencies have found no such
differences for current products." Id. "[A] percentage of consumers who think GE foods are the
same as or better than unlabeled foods still would not buy a labeled GE food." Id.
134. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
135. See id. at 448 (holding "mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a
home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the
like').
136. GATT, supra note 73, at Art. IX; see also Terence P. Stewart et al., Trade and Cattle:
How the System Is Failing an Industry in Crisis, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 449, 508 (2000).
"The [WTO] Technical Committee's work makes clear.., that mandatory country of origin
labeling is consistent with WTO obligations.. ." Id.
137. It is evident that many consumers consciously prefer to purchase domestic products.
One recent example was the reaction of consumers to a proposal by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to change the requirements for the "Made in USA" label. In December
1997, the FTC published a notice in the Federal Register recounting its "comprehensive review
of 'Made in USA' and other U.S. origin claims in product advertising and labeling." "Made in
USA" and Other U.S. Origin Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756 (Dec. 2, 1997). The FTC had
historically required "that a product must be wholly domestic or all or virtually all made in the
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origin labeling for imported products, 138 while it does not require
labeling of LMOs.1
39
To compare the Protocol labeling requirement to the country of
origin labeling under GATT, it is necessary to return to the three
scenarios under which the Protocol requires LMO labeling. In the
first two scenarios, risks related to LMO food products have either
been found to exist or to presumptively exist due to a lack of
sufficient probative information. Under these circumstances the
product label permits an individual consumer to make purchasing
decisions based on individual considerations of product risks. LMO
labeling thus allows consumers to make choices based on the quality,
including the safety, of available products. The country of origin
labeling permitted by GATT, however, bears no relation to the
quality of the product. It merely provides domestic consumers with a
basis for discriminating against out of state products. 140 In sum, the
United States to substantiate an unqualified 'Made in USA' claim." Id. In May 1997, the FTC
issued Proposed Guides for the Use of U.S. Origin Claims, under which a marketer could make
an unqualified U.S. origin claim if there was a reasonable basis substantiating that the product
was substantially all made in the United States. Request for Public Comment on Proposed
Guide for the Use of U.S. Origin Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 25,020 (May 7, 1997). The Proposed
Guides also included two "safe harbors" under which an unqualified U.S. origin claim would
not be considered deceptive. Id. The FTC received 1,057 comments representing 1,165
commenters, including 963 individual commenters, 24 members of Congress, and two
consumer organizations. Id. at 63,757. The consumer commenters
overwhelmingly opposed the Proposed Guides and generally supported an "all or
virtually all" standard or advocated a specific percentage, usually 90% or, more often,
100%. Many commenters stated that "'Made in USA' means what it says" or
expressed similar sentiments. Several commenters asserted that changing the current
standard would confuse consumers wishing to buy American products, leaving them
unable to determine whether a product was truly made in the United States.
Individual consumers also stated that they buy American products to support fellow
Americans and expressed concern that lowering the standard would lead to a loss in
American jobs.
Id. at 63,758.
138. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1994):
[E]very article of foreign origin.., imported into the United States shall be marked in
a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the nature of the article
... will permit in such manner as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser in the United
States... the country of origin of the article.
139. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
140. Compare Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, in which the
Supreme Court held that North Carolina violated the requirements of the dormant commerce
Journal of Law & Policy
Protocol's labeling requirement in these two circumstances is more
defensible than the labeling permitted by GATT.
Under the third scenario, the Protocol's labeling requirement does
not fare as well. In this situation the state has concluded that the
LMO food products do not pose a risk. The label, although factually
true, is likely to have the effect of prompting a product choice that is
unrelated to the quality of the product, because although the LMO is
safe, consumers could still avoid any product that bears an LMO
label. In this context, the Protocol's required label interacts with the
attitudes of the purchaser in ways that are similar to the country of
origin labels, which also have no relation to the quality of the
product. The Protocol's labeling requirement in this context is
defensible only on the ground that it appears no worse than country
of origin labeling.
14
In sum, the labeling requirement adopted by the Protocol, while
flawed, is defensible under some circumstances. It does, however,
appear to apply too broadly and may, for that reason, be inconsistent
with the international trade regime.
V. CONCLUSION
The Protocol establishes a two pronged approach regarding the
international trade of genetically modified agricultural products. With
clause when it imposed a statutory bar against the labeling of Washington state apples regarding
their origin and state rating.
Tihe statute has the effect of stripping away from the Washington apple industry the
competitive and economic advantages it has earned for itself through its expensive
inspection and grading system. The record demonstrates that the Washington apple-
grading system has gained nationwide acceptance in the apple trade. Indeed, it
contains numerous affidavits from apple brokers and dealers located both inside and
outside of North Carolina who state their preference, and that of their customers, for
apples graded under the Washington, as opposed to the USDA system because of the
former's greater consistency, its emphasis on color, and its supporting mandatory
inspections. Once again, the statute had no similar impact on the North Carolina apple
industry and thus operated to its benefit.
432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977).
141. Indeed, the Protocol requirement may not be as bad as country of origin labeling
because the nondiscrimination principle would require that domestic LMO food products also
bear the required label. In this manner, there would not be discrimination against imported
products, only discrimination against all LMO food products.
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respect to the AIA regime for products that are released into the
environment, the Protocol properly requires the providing of
information to importing states. The Protocol creates strong
incentives for the development of adequate scientific information to
form the basis for risk management decisions.
Regarding the labeling required for LMOs intended as food
products, the Protocol's regime is more problematic. Its requirement
is overinclusive in some respects and underinclusive in others.
Underinclusiveness results from the fact that, when residual risks are
present as a result of the decision to allow imports, the required label
states only that the product "may contain," rather than "does
contain," genetically modified materials. Overinclusiveness results
from the fact that the label requirement hypothetically applies even
when the importing nation has allowed the import of genetically
modified food products based on a conclusion that the product poses
no risks. It may be most sensible to view the Protocol's regulatory
regime as providing a transitional rule until a firmer basis for risk
management decisions develops through better scientific studies.
1 42
142. This assessment of the modest accomplishment that the Protocol represents is
consistent with the views of other commentators. See Jacob, supra note 46, at 89. Cf.
McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 102:
We know there are potential problems; we need more knowledge; we should proceed
cautiously; we should develop a tighter regulatory scheme; international trade law
should, and apparently does, permit countries to exclude GM food as to which they
can make a prima facie showing that it may be dangerous. Let us hope that commercial
considerations do not blind us to a proper, far-sighted approach to managing the risks
associated with biotechnology.
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